Social Policy in Title VII Arbitrations by Wolfson, Steven R.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 68 | Issue 1 Article 3
1979
Social Policy in Title VII Arbitrations
Steven R. Wolfson
Internal Revenue Service
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and
Arbitration Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wolfson, Steven R. (1979) "Social Policy in Title VII Arbitrations," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 68 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol68/iss1/3
Social Policy in Title VII Arbitrations
By STEVEN R. WOLFSON*
INTRODUCTION
"Where the collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with
Title VII, the arbitrator must follow the agreement."'
With these words, the United States Supreme Court
fanned a conflagration which has engulfed the labor relations
world. The controversy centers on the propriety and extent to
which labor arbitrators may consider the social policy underly-
ing Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act2 in deciding discrimi-
nation grievances. This article examines the dilemma arbitra-
tors face in attempting to divorce arbitration from social policy
by analyzing Title VII arbitrations where social policy has had
a major impact.
The notion that social policies are reflected in the law is
based on the idea that laws are neither enacted, nor do they
operate, "in a vacuum.' ' The arbitration process clearly paral-
lels the law in this respect. Although outwardly judging labor
relations, arbitrators also judge human relations, since con-
tract disputes arise by virtue of human disagreements. Like the
opinions of judges, the opinions of arbitrators often reflect so-
cial policies which transcend the results in particular cases. It
is therefore impossible to divorce social policy from arbitration.
In recent years, Title VII has been a fertile ground for
weaving social policy into the fabric of labor arbitration.
Unquestionably, the single most important social policy be-
hind Title VII is to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
* Attorney, Southwest Regional Counsel (General Legal Services), Internal Reve-
nue Service. B.A. 1973, University of Texas at Austin; J.D. 1976, St. Mary's University
School of Law; LL.M. 1978, University of Texas at Austin. The author's views do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Internal Revenue Service or of the Chief Counsel's
office.
I Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
3 This phrase was used by arbitrator Daniel Dykstra in Kaiser-Permanente Medi-
cal Care Program, 64 LAB. ARB. REP. 245, 247 (1975).
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sary barriers to employment"4 which are based upon race, reli-
gion, sex or nationality. The vastness of this policy is under-
scored by the massive debates and lawsuits which it generates.
Arbitrators are daily adjudicating Title VII grievances, and in
so doing they simply cannot ignore the policy behind the law.
An arbitrator who closes his or her eyes to the implicit policy
considerations can never truly resolve a dispute. It is the posi-
tion of this article that arbitrators must consider social policy
in resolving Title VII grievances.
I. TE DILEMMA BETWEEN ARBITRATION AND THE LAW
The debate concerning arbitrators considering social pol-
icy under Title VII grew out of the more general question of
whether arbitrators should consider the law of Title VII.5 An
understanding of this dilemma is necessary before exploring
the more profound problems inherent in arbitrators weighing
social policy.
A. Is the Arbitrator Limited to Contractual Interpretation?
Two divergent philosophies provide the crux of the debate
over legal determinations being made by arbitrators. Oppo-
nents of arbitrators examining the law believe that because
arbitration is created contractually, the arbitrator owes un-
compromising fidelity to the contract. In the event of a conflict
between the law and the labor agreement, "the arbitrator
should respect the agreement and ignore the law."' Arbitral
considerations may extend to the "law of the shop," but any
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
See e.g., Howlett, A Reprise, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN
ARBITRATION 64 (C. Rehmus ed. 1969); Meltzer, The Role of Law in Arbitration: A
Rejoinder, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION 58 (C. Rehmus ed.
1969); Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in DEVELOPMENTs IN AMERICAN AND
FOREIGN ARBITRATION 42 (C. Rebmus ed. 1969); McKelvey, Sex and the Single
Arbitrator, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 335 (1971); Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and
Discrimination: The Parties' Process and the Public's Purposes, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 724
(1976); Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for
Employment Discrimination, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 30 (1971).
6 Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping Conflicting Remedies for Employ-
ment Discrimination, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 30, 33 (1971).
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movement into the public law exceeds the arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion.7
Proponents assert that arbitrators should have freedom to
interpret the labor agreement within its legal context. Since an
illegal contract is no contract, arbitrators lack authority to con-
sider illegal contract provisions. They must therefore consider
the contract in light of the public law, which logically requires
a consideration of the social policy behind that law.
Both philosophies create a dilemma for arbitrators. In case
of a conflict between the labor agreement and the law, common
sense dictates that in the final analysis the law will prevail.
Yet, should an arbitrator who is engaged to resolve contractual,
as distinguished from legal, disputes be permitted to look be-
yond the actual contract into legal considerations?
B. Judicial Response: Constrained Within the Contract
Courts have held arbitrators correct in putting the con-
tract ahead of the law where there is a direct conflict between
the two. A recent case, Telephone Workers Local 827 v. New
Jersey Bell Telephone Company,8 illustrates this point. In
Telephone Workers Local 827, the New Jersey Bell Telephone
Company and the United States Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) had joined in a judicial consent
decree which established goals and timetables for correcting an
imbalance in racial, ethnic and sexual compositions in eleven
different job classifications. The consent decree contained an
override provision in which the company agreed that it should
"necessarily promote one who is not the most senior or hire a
member of the under-utilized race or sex."9 The purpose of this
provision was that in certain circumstances the consent decree
should supercede conflicting provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, most notably the seniority provision, the
literal interpretation of which could impede fulfillment of the
company's goals and timetables.
One of these goals was to employ more men as operations
clerks, a job traditionally held almost exclusively by women.
7Id.
8 450 F. Supp. 284 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd, 584 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1978).
1 Id. at 288-89.
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Bertha Biel, a longtime woman employee of the company, ap-
plied for a promotion as an operations clerk but was rejected
because the company was lagging in its goal to hire more men
for that job. The company hired a new man "from off the
street."'" Consequently, Biel's union filed a grievance, alleging
company violation of the seniority and nondiscrimination pro-
visions of the labor agreement.
The grievance proceeded to arbitration where an arbitra-
tion panel held in favor of the union on both its allegations, and
ordered the company to promote Biel to operations clerk and
pay her the difference in salary between the two positions from
the time the outsider was hired. In reaching this decision, the
arbitration panel followed the agreement eschewing the law
and the consent decree.
[W]henever . . . primary jurisdiction to adjudicate the
question of law resides with the courts, the arbitrator should
refrain from and make it clear that he is not deciding the
issue of law but only the narrower question of contract inter-
pretation."
Citing its obligations under the consent decree, the company
refused to comply with the arbitration award. The union
thereupon filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 to enforce the award. 12
The federal district court rejected the union's demand and
vacated the arbitration award on the ground that it conflicted
with the terms of the consent decree. Although vacating the
arbitration award, the court held that "[tihe arbitrator . . .
properly refrained from deciding the merits of the application
of the Consent Decree."" Implicit in the court's opinion was
the conclusion that the reasoning of the arbitrator was correct,
even though the decision was wrong. How could the arbitrator
have correctly reasoned to the wrong conclusion? Alas, this
result illustrates the dilemma of ignoring the law and respect-
ing the agreement.
,0 Id. at 286.
" Id. at 291.
12 Arbitration decisions are enforceable under the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
"1 450 F. Supp. at 292.
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The problem is not purely academic. In the real-life in-
dustrial world of punching time clocks and standing on assem-
bly lines, arbitration is intended to resolve labor disagreements
with a minimum of production disruption. Yet, here is a situa-
tion where arbitrators must decide wrongly if they are to decide
correctly. As ridiculous as this conclusion seems, it is precisely
the one which is compelled under opinions such as Telephone
Workers Local 827 and, indeed, it appears to be the law. As the
court in Telephone Workers Local 827 declared: "[T]he arbi-
trator's province is limited to the contract between the parties
and so much of his decision as rests solely upon considerations
extrinsic to the contract is subject to plenary review by the
court."14
C. The Problem of Title VII Contractual and Legal Coexten-
sive Prohibitions
At this point, the parameters of the arbitrator's dilemma
seem fairly well defined. A boundary exists between law and
contract, and the arbitrator should not cross the line from the
contract into the law. Unfortunately, in Title VII grievances
the delineation often is not that clear, in that contractual and
legal prohibitions frequently co-exist. Most modem collective
bargaining agreements specifically include nondiscrimination
clauses which parallel the prohibitions of Title VII. 15
The incorporation of nondiscrimination provisions into
collective bargaining agreements creates the most perplexing
dilemma for arbitrators considering the law of Title VII. If the
words of the statute are incorporated, often verbatim, into the
agreement, why should the arbitrator not consider the law as
part of the agreement? More important than the language of
such provisions is their intent. Since equal employment oppor-
tunity already is the law, why should management and labor
incorporate additional nondiscrimination provisions into their
agreement? Such provisions are not included as a mere gesture
I !d.
In 1973, 74% of 400 sample contracts contained nondiscrimination clauses simi-
lar to section 703(a)(1) of Title VII. This figure was up from 46% in 1970, and 28% in




to the ideal of equal employment opportunity. To the contrary,
nondiscrimination provisions have a substantive purpose.
Since that purpose is, and can only be, the promotion of equal
employment opportunity, the issue "is not whether arbitrators
apply the law, but. . . what law they apply."' 6
The quotation cited at the beginning of this article inti-
mated that the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that arbi-
trators may apply the law of Title VII. The landmark decision
in which that quotation appeared, Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Company, ,7 drew into focus the judicial view of arbitra-
tion in the enforcement of Title VII. In Alexander, a discharged
black employee, Alexander, filed a racial discrimination griev-
ance which proceeded to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled that
the employee had been fired for "just cause,"' 8 but "made no
reference to [the] claim of racial discrimination."" Unhappy
with this ruling, and after complying with necessary statutory
procedure, Alexander filed suit in federal court under Title VII.
The primary issue was whether Alexander's prior submission of
the Title VII claim to arbitration was an election of remedies
or a waiver of his right to sue. The Supreme Court held that it
was not. Citing the nationwide policy of equal employment
opportunity, the Court held that "final responsibility for en-
forcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts."'"
With this issue decided, the Court, for reasons unknown,
digressed upon an issue removed from the one at bar. By its
digression, the Court attempted to answer the very complex
questions relating to arbitration and consideration of the law
of Title VII. In a rather contradictory passage the Court first
stated that the arbitrator "has no general authority to invoke
public laws that conflict with the bargain between the par-
ties,"'2' yet said that the arbitrator may "look for guidance from
,1 Block, Legal and Traditional Criteria in the Arbitration of Sex Discrimination
Grievances, 32 ARB. J. 241, 243 (1977).
,1 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Is Section six of the collective-bargaining contract required that an employee
would not be "discharged, suspended or given a written warning notice except for just
cause." Id. at 39.
,1 Id. at 42.
"Id. at 44.
2, Id. at 53.
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many sources. 22 The Court finally found that "an arbitral de-
cision . . . based 'solely upon the arbitrator's view of the re-
quirement of enacted legislation,' rather than on an interpreta-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement . . . will not be
enforced. Thus the arbitrator has authority to resolve only
questions of contractual rights." 2r
This statement would appear to be a definitive foreclosure
of the issue, were it not for a final footnote added by the
Court.24 Although the Court did criticize the practice of arbitra-
tors considering Title VII, it refused to ban the practice com-
pletely. In that final footnote the Court suggested a number of
principles which could be applied by federal district courts in
according "weight" to prior Title VII arbitrations as evidence
in subsequent federal suits.25 In addition, the Court noted:
"Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an
employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it
great weight. ' 2 This footnote is the famous and frequently
cited "footnote 21," which left open a wedge for arbitrators to
continue considering Title VII, a practice which not only has
refused to die but has flourished.
II. THE DILEMMA BETWEEN ARBITRATION AND SOCIAL POLICY
An even more poignant dilemma than the one between
arbitration and the law is found between arbitration and social
policy. Law is fairly well defined, but social policy usually ex-
ists in an amorphic, uncodified state. The arbitrator therefore
knows not where to tread. No guidelines clarify when the arbi-
trator should retreat to the labor agreement, progress to the
social policy or straddle the boundary between the two. Never-
theless, arbitrators often accept the challenge of incorporating
social policy in their deliberations.
22 Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
2 Id. at 53-54.
21 Id. at 60 n.21.
2 Id. These factors included: "ITihe existence of provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of proce-
dural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue




A. The "Just Cause" Concept: Fertile Ground for Policy
Infusion
The "just cause" requirement found in most labor agree-
ments provides a fertile area through which arbitrators may
delve into the realm of social policy. Such provisions generally
require that employees covered by the contract may not be
discharged or otherwise disciplined without "just cause."
Grappling with this concept has caused many arbitrators to
consider social policy in defining "just cause," particularly in
disputes involving personal safety, national security or prior
criminal convictions.
28
1. Personal Safety Discharges
When an employer defends a firing on considerations of
personal safety, arbitrators are reluctant to question the em-
ployer's "just cause" determination. Since a mistake by the
arbitrator could cost health or lives, arbitrators tend to be con-
servative, deferring to the judgment of the employer. This
tendency is illustrated in Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc.,29 where the arbitrator upheld the discharge of a bus driver
who failed to "stop, look and listen" at a railroad crossing. The
arbitrator acknowledged the danger of second guessing the
employer.
In dealing with the general run of offenses, the proper func-
tion of discipline is to correct an employee's conduct; dis-
charge is justified only when an employee's prior disciplinary
record indicates that he is incorrigible. It is universally recog-
nized, however, that there are some offenses which are of so
serious a nature that the employer cannot properly be re-
quired to run the risk of their repetition."0
2 A study conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs showed that 80 percent of
the collective agreements surveyed contained a provision stating that there must be
just cause for discharge. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CoNTRAcrs (BNA)
40:1.
. For an extensive anthology of such cases, see Blumrosen, Public Policy Consid-
erations in Labor Arbitration Cases, 14 RuT. L. REv. 217 (1960). See also Seitz, The
Arbitrator's Responsibility for Public Policy, 19 Aim. J. 23 (1964); Summers, Labor
Arbitration: A Private Process with a Public Function, 34 REv. Jur. U.P.R. 477 (1965).
19 LAB. ARm. REP. 210 (1952).
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 19 LAB. APB. REP. 210, 212 (1952); accord,
[Vol. 68
TITLE VII ARBITRATIONS
Thus, in questions involving safety risks, arbitrators focus on
the underlying policy of promoting safety.
2. National Security Discharges
In the area of discharges based on national security, arbi-
trators tend to defer less to management's determinations. Per-
haps national security poses a less immediate threat than the
personal safety of particular, identifiable individuals, thus al-
lowing arbitrators more leeway.
The leading national security decision is Black v. Cutter
Laboratories,31 in which an employee was fired for being a
member of the Communist party and for falsifying her employ-
ment application. The circumstances were exacerbated by the
fact that her job, producing antibiotics for both the civilian and
military markets, was a sensitive one. An arbitration panel
held that the employee had actually been fired for union activ-
ity and accordingly ordered her reinstated with backpay.32 The
California Supreme Court vacated the decision, primarily on
social policy grounds.
[A]n arbitration award which directs that a member of the
Communist Party who is dedicated to that party's program
of "sabotage, force, violence and the like" be reinstated to
employment in a plant which produces antibiotics used by
both the military and civilians is against public policy, as
expressed in both federal and state laws, is therefore illegal
and void and will not be enforced by the courts.?
Western Express Co., 10 LAB. ARB. REP. 1972 (1948) (discharge sustained for truck
driver who was driving while intoxicated). But see Couey v. Arrow Coach Lines, Inc.,
288 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956) (court enforced arbitration award reinstating a
bus driver who violated a company rule against speeding and smoking. Arbitrator had
held that the violations did not constitute just cause for discharge). For other notable
personal safety cases, see e.g., James Vernor Co., 20 LAB. ARB. REP. 50 (1953) (dis-
charge of boiler operator upheld for getting drunk and falling asleep on job); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. 18 LAB. ARm. REP. 656 (1952) (discharge of pilot upheld for series of minor
incidents); Standard Oil Co., (Indiana), 14 LAB. ARB. REP. 516 (1950) (discharge upheld
for negligently switching gasoline and furnace oil).
11 278 P.2d 905 (Cal.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 816 (1955), cert. dismissed, 351 U.S.
292 (1956).
3 Id. at 911.
3 Id. But see Foote Bros. Gear & Mach. Corp., 13 LAB. Aim. REP. 848 (1949);
Curtis-Wright Corp., 9 LAB. Aim. RaP. 77 (1947); Spokane-Idaho Mining Co., 9 LAB.
Aim. RaP. 749 (1947) (membership in Communist Party insufficient to uphold dis-
1979-80]
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It is interesting to note the similarity between Cutter
Laboratories and Telephone Workers Local 827. 3 Recall that in
Telephone Workers, the arbitrator properly refrained from con-
sidering the law and accordingly made an incorrect award.3 5 In
Cutter Laboratories, the arbitrators also eschewed the policy
"expressed in both federal and state laws, '3 and made an in-
correct award based upon the narrow contractual ground of
charge). See also Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 178 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct.),
modified, 180 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd mem., 161 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1959). The appellate division's opinion in Carey v. Westinghouse marked a retreat
from the earlier New York doctrine found in Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Local 402 v.
Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947), aff'd mem., 74 N.E.2d
464 (N.Y. 1947). Briefly, the Cutler-Hammer doctrine held that if a court determined
in the first instance that a contract provision was "beyond d~spute," there could be
no arbitration. 67 N.Y.S.2d 318. This principle was criticipti by the United States
Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1980). The
Court said that the Cutler-Hammer doctrine "could only have a crippling effect on
grievance arbitration." Id. at 566-67.
New York since has overruled the Cutler-Hammer decision both judicially, In Re
Wilaka Constr. Co., 216 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. 1966), and statutorily, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law
§ 7501 (McKinney). Thus, courts are no longer free to determine in advance the merits
of arbitration disputes. Public policy militates in favor of submitting labor disputes
to arbitration; and even where a claim of arbitrability is tenuous, courts still favor
arbitration. At minimum, "if the arbitration clause is 'susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute,' then it is for the arbitrator to decide whether the
dispute comes within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate . . . ." Board of Educ.
of Buffalo v. Buffalo Council of Supervisors and Adm'rs, 383 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The current New York view has
been enunciated in Gangel v. N. DeGrott, PVBA, 362 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1977).
[Aln arbitration clause must be read conservatively if it is subject to an
equivocal reading . . . .A distinction must be drawn. The agreement to
arbitrate must be express, direct, and unequivocal as to the issues of disputes
to be submitted to arbitration. But, once there is agreement or submission
to arbitration, the scope of the arbitrators is unlimited, and with very limited
exceptions, reviewable ....
Id. at 250 (citations omitted).
It is still a "threshold" determination "for the courts to decide" whether arbitra-
tion of some particular matter would violate public policy. Board of Educ. of Buffalo
v. Buffalo Council of Supervisors and Adm'rs, 383 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976). If it would violate public policy, the courts could enjoin arbitration. Enjoinable
policy violations include child custody, wills and probate, antitrust and securities
actions. For a discussion of arbitrations under the Securities Act of 1933 see notes 45-
56 infra and accompanying text.
' See notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Telephone
Workers Local 82Z
- See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the arbitrator's
dilemma in this situation.
11 278 P.2d at 911.
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discriminating against union activity. This action may have
been proper arbitration procedure, but by refusing to acknowl-
edge the height of the paranoia of Communism during that
era the arbitration panel in Cutter Laboratories somehow
neglected its function. During the 1950's, it is doubtful that
any court would have enforced the arbitration award. Although
the California Supreme Court's decision in Cutter Laboratories
may be unpalatable by today's standards, it provides a clear
example of a court vacating an arbitral award on policy
grounds.
3. Criminal Conviction Discharges
The issue in prior criminal conviction discharges is akin to
double jeopardy in that a person first is convicted and then
punished again by discharge due to the conviction. The policy
question is whether it is in the public interest to deny someone
a livelihood because of a criminal conviction. The answer de-
pends on the nature of the crime.
The landmark case in this area is Local 453, International
Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Otis Elevator
Company,37 in which Joseph Calise was convicted of a misde-
meanor (willful possession of gambling slips on his employer's
premises) and was fined $250.00. Four days after his convic-
tion, Calise was discharged for violating a company rule
against gambling on company premises.
Calise grieved the discharge and the dispute went to arbi-
tration. The arbitrator ruled that Calise had not been dis-
charged for "just cause," and ordered him reinstated but with-
out backpay, accrual of seniority or other contract benefits.
The arbitration decision relied heavily upon the idea that Cal-
ise had paid his debt to society by his conviction, in addition
to his loss of backpay, seniority and other benefits from the
time of his discharge to the time of the arbitration decision.3
Otis Elevator refused to abide by the decision. The union
sued Otis to force compliance. The district court denied injunc-
tive enforcement of the award, rejected the union's motion for




summary judgment, and instead granted summary judgment
for Otis, thereby vacating the arbitration award.39 The court
held the award to be "void and unenforceable" because it
violated an "overriding public policy" and "indulges crime,
cripples an employer's power to support the law, and impairs
his right to prevent exposure to criminal liability."4
From this decision, the union appealed. The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals chided the district court for considering
perfunctorily the social policy upon which it based its deci-
sion.41 In essence, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district
court over interpretation of the policy considerations.42 Taking
judicial notice of New York policy against gambling, the Sec-
ond Circuit undertook its own assessment of the content of the
social policy involved.
Two points emerged. First, the court noted that Calise
already had been punished by his conviction as well as by his
layoff between the time of his discharge and his reinstatement
without backpay or benefits. 3 Second, and more significant,
the court took judicial notice of "the important role which
employment plays in implementing the public policy of reha-
bilitating those convicted of crime.""
One of the lessons taught by Otis Elevator is that social
policy can neither be ignored nor treated lightly. The case also
" Id. at 27. The district court opinion granting summary judgment is reported at
206 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Judge Cashin in that case relied on an earlier
opinion by Judge MacMahon of the same court in which a motion to enforce the
arbitration award was denied. Local 453, International Union of Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers v. Otis Elevator Company, 201 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
, 201 F. Supp. at 218.
4 314 F.2d at 28-29.
42 Id. at 29. Accord, Metal Products Workers Union, Local 1645 v. Torrington Co.,
358 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
,3 314 F.2d at 29.
" Id. The Court stated:
[Tihere can hardly be a public policy that a man who has been convicted,
fined, and subjected to serious disciplinary measures can never be ordered
reinstated to his former employment . . .when the arbitrator found no
indication that reinstatement would result in repetition of the illegal activ-
ity.
Id. Accord, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Houston Chem. Plant v. Sanford, 540 S.W.2d
478 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d
1223 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820 (1969). But see Avco Corp. v. Preteska, 174
A.2d 684 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1961).
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illustrates that social policy considerations, for arbitrators as
well as for judges, are not off-limits. Not only can they be
helpful, but they actually can be determinative of whether a
decision is correct. For no matter how isolated a particular
arbitration award may be in its particular labor context, it
must always withstand scrutiny in its overall social setting. For
this reason, arbitrators should consider social policy and do so
carefully, not superficially.
B. Judicial Protection of Statutory Rights: A Securities Act
Analogy
Before examining social policy considerations under Title
VII as they apply to arbitration, it is instructive to look at an
analogous problem in the context of the Securities Act of 1933.
In Wilko v. Swan,45 the validity of agreements to arbitrate dis-
putes under the Securities Act of 1933 was questioned. In this
case, a client of a securities brokerage firm sued the firm for
damages under the Securities Act. The firm moved to stay the
suit pending arbitration of the claim under section 3 of the
United States Arbitration Act,4" which had been incorporated
by reference into the margin agreements executed by the client.
The district court denied the motion on the ground that the
margin agreements illegally attempted to deprive the client of
his judicial remedy under the Securities Act. The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed" and the Supreme Court re-
versed the Second Circuit, holding that agreements to arbitrate
future disputes under the Securities Act of 1933 were illegal
and void.
The Court distinguished between arbitral "considerations
of fairness" and considerations of law." In Wilko, considera-
tions of law prevailed, rendering void the agreement to arbi-
trate, even though under the explicit terms of the agreement
' 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
" 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1978). The United States Arbitration Act applies only to
commercial and maritime arbitrations, as distinguished from labor arbitrations. See
General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 353
U.S. 547 (1957).
' 201 F.2d 439.
" 346 U.S. at 433-34.
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the arbitrator may not have been required to follow the law."
The Court explained that the securities law was enacted for the
purpose of equalizing positions of buyers and sellers with re-
gard to investment disclosures, and that agreements to arbi-
trate future controversies would engender defeat of this pur-
pose. The Court envisioned that sellers would employ "take it
or leave it" tactics and contracts of adhesion to obtain such a
result:
When the security buyer, prior to any violation of the
Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up
more than would a participant in other business transactions.
The security buyer has a wider choice of courts and venue.
He thus surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him
and surrenders it at a time when he is less able to judge the
weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his
adversary.' 0
This language raises some important similarities between
Wilko and Gardner-Denver.51 Recall that Gardner-Denver
stood for the proposition that federal courts, not arbitrators,
were the final judges of Title VII rights in our society.52 Simi-
larly, Wilko held that agreements to arbitrate future securities
disputes were void.5
Wilko left open the question of the validity of agreements
to arbitrate existing disputes under the Securities Act, how-
ever, and subsequent decisions have held that such agreements
may be valid." The court in Gardner-Denver held that binding
,Id.
Id. at 435.
, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
52 See notes 17-26 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Gardner-
Denver holding.
" See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 438 (Jackson, J., concurring).
1 See, e.g., Gardner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971) (agreement to arbitrate existing claim under Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934 valid); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279
F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968); Moran v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 220 A.2d 624 (Pa. 1966); cf. Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41
(5th Cir. 1974) (antitrust claim); Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp.
1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd mem., 486 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1973) (claims under Trade
Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15
U.S.C. § 70a, and Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45); see also Lewis v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (agree-
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agreements to arbitrate future Title VII controversies were in-
valid,5 but equivocated on the issue of existing disputes."
Therefore, as in Wilko, the prohibition in Title VII arbitrations
is upon prospective waivers of adjudicating claims in court.
The protection lies in waiving future claims at a time when one
is unable to understand the significance of the waiver.
Another similarity between the two cases is also impor-
tant. What is actually forbidden are final and binding at-
tempts to arbitrate future Title VII claims. In no other way is
the use of arbitration expressly curtailed. Gardner-Denver
simply deprives arbitration of its traditional finality and
allows a grievant who is dissatisfied with an arbitrator's
decision another chance in court. Despite detracting dicta
primarily toward the end of the opinion, the basis for the
Court's decision in Gardner-Denver is that "final responsi-
bility for enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal
courts."5 Therefore, even though employees may not relin-
quish their right to sue, they may nonetheless submit their
claims to arbitration. A court in a subsequent lawsuit on the
same claim may accord the arbitration opinion whatever
weight it deems appropriate.58
These similarities manifest the convergence of the theories
behind Gardner-Denver and Wilko. Both are premised not so
much on jurisdiction but on judicial protection of statutory
rights. Although courts jealously guard statutory rights,5 they
ment toarbitrate future claims under the Employees Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) void); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 329 F. Supp. 1296 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), affl'd, 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972) (Plaintiff, a
sophisticated investor and member of the New York Stock Exchange, was bound by
his arbitration agreement. "[A] person aware of possible claims against another is
bound by any subsequent agreement to arbitrate disputes between them which is
knowingly entered into.") 329 F. Supp. at 1298. But see Romnes v. Bache & Co. Inc.
439 F. Supp., 833 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (no public policy against arbitration of prospective
claims under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-3006).
415 U.S. at 51-52.
"' Id. at 60 n.21.
7 Id. at 44.
"' Id. at 60 n.21. Footnote 21 and its accompanying text suggest that arbitration
opinions may be given weight as evidence by federal courts in subsequent Title VII
suits on the same claims. The degree of weight depends upon factors in the collective
bargaining agreement and the arbitration hearing. Ultimately, however, the degree of
weight is determinable in the trial court's discretion. See note 25 supra for factors that
may be considered in determining the weight to be accorded the arbitration.
1' Other than the Securities Act, other statutory rights seemingly forbidden to
arbitration include patents, trademarks and copyrights, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a) (1970);
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tend to defer to arbitration of contractual rights. Thus courts
impliedly distinguish between the statutory law and the law of
the shop, the former being reserved for the courts and the latter
for arbitration. Where legislatures have not provided a judi-
cially enforceable remedy, the remedy of arbitration appears to
be final."
see Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc. 381 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975);
accord, Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The reasons for prohibit-
ing arbitration of such rights include: (1) the broad social interests involved, (2) the
complexity of issues and evidence, and (3) the dubious propriety of permitting arbitra-
tors, who often are selected for their business acumen, to interpret the very laws which
are meant to govern them. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391
F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968).
Two other areas forbidden to arbitration are: (1) the traditional states' rights of
child custody and support, wills and probate and state employment, and (2) for want
of a better term, a category referred to as the "anomalies."
For some interesting decisions involving child custody and support, see e.g.,
Swartz v. Swartz, 374 N.Y.S.2d 857 (App. Div. 1975); Wertlake v. Wertlake, 318 A.2d
446 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1974), modified, 349 A.2d 552, 559 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Nestel
v. Nestel, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241 (App. Div. 1972); Ringland v. Ringland, 324 N.Y.S.2d 935
(Sup. Ct. 1971); In Re Michaelman, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1954). For the wills
and probate prohibition, see e.g., In Re Will of Jacobovitz, 295 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct.
1968). And in regard to state employment matters, most prominently teachers' rights,
see e.g., Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. Anderson, 380 A.2d 1032 (Md. Ct.
App. 1977); In Re the Arbitration between Fort Ann Cent. School Dist. and Fort Ann
Cent. School Teachers Ass'n, 386 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1976); Board of Educ.,
Greenburgh Cent. School Dist. No. 7 v. Greenburgh Teachers Fed'n Local 1788, 381
N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1976).
An assortment of some fascinating "anomolies" include e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters Local 117 v. Washington Employers, Inc., 557 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1977) (Notwith-
standing management's argument that arbitration award violated federal law, court
held that enforcement of award was de minimis, since it bound only immediate parties
to dispute and involved only one transaction); Gulf States Tel. Co. v. Local 1692, Int'l
Bhd of Electrical Workers, 416 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1969) (in Texas, an award of rein-
statement with backpay for gossiping and rumor-mongering does not violate public
policy); Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1966) (permission to arbitrate effects of
discharge in bankruptcy is within the sole discretion of the bankruptcy court); Rsen-
blum v. Steiner, 390 N.Y.S.2d 106 (App. Div. 1977) (defense of usury is not arbitrable
"as a matter of public policy"); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (arbitral
award of punitive damages forbidden); Weiner v. Ernest M. Weiner, D.P.M., P.C., 390
N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (issue whether a physician operating a professional
corporation may use the name of another physician for that corporation is not arbitra-
ble); Publishers Ass'n of New York City v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 114
N.Y.S.2d 401 (App. Div. 1952) (good explanation why punitive damages cannot be
awarded in arbitration).
60 See, e.g., Romnes v. Bache & Co., Inc., 439 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Wis. 1977), a
suit under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-50. The defendant
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C. Title VII: Justification for Social Policy Considerations
Under most modern labor agreements, Title VII rights are
a hybrid of statutory and contractual rights. Title VII never
was intended to be exclusively a judically enforceable right;
"[1]egislative enactments in this area have long evinced a
general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination."'" Therefore, Title VII is not on the face
of the statute, nor in its purpose, forbidden to arbitration. Al-
though with arbitration and judicial sanctions employees do
possess two stones in their slings, the courts insist that the
extra weapon not be abused.
62
The magnitude of Title VII is reflected in its social preva-
lence. The doctrine of equal employment opportunity is not an
esoteric policy which only the courts are privy to consider. It is
a policy which permeates all of society. The reach of that policy
is evident in its inclusion in most modern labor agreements. It
is not just the law of the land; it is also the law of the shop. It
is not purely statutory, but also contractual, and arbitration is
the traditional tribunal for adjudicating contractual rights.
moved to stay proceedings pending arbitration. The plaintiff analogized the CEA to
the securities law which was held nonarbitrable in Wilko v. Swan 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
The court averred that the right to damages under the CEA was "judicially created."
However, "Congress did not see fit in the case of the CEA, as it did in the federal
securities acts, to provide such a right of action and to prohibit waiver thereof." 439
F. Supp. at 838. The court granted the motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration.
Id. at 840.
11 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (footnote omitted); cf.
Gonzales v. Shanker, 399 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("It seems to us that Alexander
also precludes any requirement that purely contractual remedies be exhausted in civil
rights actions brought under sections other than Title VII, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, §
1983, § 1985 or § 1986." Id. at 867).
62 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. McLean Trucking Co., 525
F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975) ("Gardner-Denver did not hold that a grievant may accept
an award of an arbitrator and settle with his employer, and thereafter sue his employer
for additional benefits." Id. at 1010. However, neither settlement nor acceptance of an
arbitration award forecloses an EEOC enforcement action. Id.); cf. United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Harris v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (employee who voluntar-
ily settles an employment discrimination claim with his employer and union may not
subsequently sue on the same claim because he becomes dissatisfied with settlement).
But cf. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Nor does
the result reached in arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement have res
judicata or collateral estoppel consequences for a Title VII suit." Id. at 657 n.44.).
1979 -801
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Title VII was expressly intended to be enforceable by con-
current, parallel and overlapping remedies as the Supreme
Court expressed in Gardner-Denver. 1 This situation is not at
all unusual in the labor relations world where statutory rights
are often accorded parallel recognition under the labor con-
tract. Two of the most common examples are sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, which pro-
hibit employer interference with or discrimination against
union activities. 4 Although the National Labor Relations
Board possesses statutory authority to enforce these sections, 5
similarly worded provisions in the labor agreement are enforce-
able through arbitration.6
This situation is also true for Title VII. Federal courts are
the final, but not the exclusive, judges of those rights. Simply
because legal rights overlap with contractual rights renders
neither right unarbitrable. By way of analogy in a securities
arbitration decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has
stated: "[N]o area of arbitration is guaranteed to be kept
insulated from important issues of substantive law. A labor-
management arbitration agreement could not be imagined to
contain the caveat, 'except when an important or novel con-
struction of the National Labor-Management Relations Act is
involved."'' 7 To imply such an exclusion would justify
"enjoining all" arbitrations." Moreover, "any manifest mis-
:3 415 U.S. at 47 (1974).
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
65 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
See e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 178 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct.),
modified, 180 N.Y.S.2d 203 (App. Div. 1958), aff'd mem., 161 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1959)
(A grievance of antiunion discrimination "is clearly arbitrable as a claimed violation
of the [National] Agreement . . . ." Id. at 849). But see Stephenson v. NLRB, 550
F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977), where the court stated:
But the Board should not defer when the issue presented involves primarily
a statutory rather than a contractual or factual issue . . . . When the arbi-
tration proceedings show a specific refusal to pass upon a statutory issue, the
Board should not defer. Likewise, when the arbitrator does not consider the
statutory issues, the Board should do so. . . . A priori, when it is impossible
to determine what issues the arbitration panel considered, or if the arbitra-
tion panel has not considered the statutory issue fairly and consistently with
the precepts and purposes of the Act, then the Board should also not defer.
Id. at 537 (citations omitted).
In Re the Revenue Properties Litigation Cases, 451 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir. 1971).
66 Id. at 314.
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reading" of the law always could "be effectively challenged in
court."69
HIL THE SoCIAL POLICY-CONTRACT DILEMMA FACED By TITLE
VII ARBrrRATORS
Title VII arbitrations by nature draw into issue primarily
innate characteristics such as race, skin color, religion, sex and
ethnic origin. The sensitive nature of differentiating in any
manner on these chiefly immutable characteristics is the most
vexing problem with Title VII's implementation. For example,
without discussing the merits of affirmative action, such action
necessarily requires discrimination on the basis of the stated
characteristics.0 Therefore, the question is: "When is discrimi-
nation illegal?" The answer depends upon value judgments
which inhere in implementing the policies of Title VII.
A. Establishing Authority for Arbitrators to Consider Title
Vff
The value judgments inherent in Title VII implementation
must be faced squarely. Examination of two arbitrations pro-
viding for such policy decisions suggest methods for creating
authority in an arbitrator to consider Title VII policy.
1. Basic Vegetable Products, Inc.
One of the most innovative Title VII arbitrations after the
Gardner-Denver decision was Basic Vegetable Products, Inc.71
In Basic Vegetable, the arbitrator derived his authority from a
labor agreement and from an EEOC conciliation agreement
which "attempted to provide the arbitrator with all the author-
ity which is accorded a Federal District Court operating under
es Id.
10 For a short, philosophical essay on this issue, see Blumrosen, Civil Rights Con-
flicts: The Uneasy Search For Peace In our Time, 27 ARB. J. 35 (1972). For a more
protracted dissertation, see Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L.
Rav. 235 (1971). See also the trinity of reverse discrimination cases: Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), vacated
as moot.
71 64 LAB. ARm. REP. 620 (1975).
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Title VII ' '72 in an effort to tailor the grievance procedure to
"whatever deference the Supreme Court may have accorded
arbitration in [Gardener-Denver].'7 3 The arbitration was sup-
posed to be final and binding on the parties.
74
The purpose of this agreement was to allow the arbitrator
to consider the law and policy of Title VII. As such, there was
an attempt to alleviate the dilemma an arbitrator faces by
being called upon to serve two masters-the law and the con-
tract. One must prevail, and under our system the law is su-
preme. Thus in Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., the arbitrator
could consider Title VII, with its underlying policy, and con-
form the contract to it.
If the Supreme Court meant to eliminate such considera-
tions it never would have authored the Gardner-Denver foot-
72 Id. The arbitrator praised the parties for their agreement:
It seems to me desirable that employment discrimination cases be heard by
arbitrators wherever possible because of the complicated and time-
consuming nature of Title VII litigation in the Federal Courts and the huge
backlog with which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is now
confronted. Delay and protracted litigation permit open wounds to fester.
But traditional arbitration procedures are no answer to this problem. It is
axiomatic that the parties provide the arbitrator with the authority to act
as a Federal District Court as was done in this case. Only under such circum-
stances can the parties hope to have the judiciary accord "great weight" to
the process.
Id. at 624-25.
7 Id. (citation omitted).
Id. Although the arbitrator expressed no opinion concerning the legality of this
agreement, it already had been established that judicial enforcement of Title VII rights
may not be prospectively waived. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974);
cf. Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 538 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976), reh. denied, 551 F.2d 93
(5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nor. Allied Chem. Corp. v. White, 434
U.S. 1051 (1978) (The district court dismissed intervenors in a Title VII suit because
they had signed an EEOC conciliation agreement containing a waiver of their right to
sue. The court of appeals held that the district court should have determined the
voluntariness of the waiver. A "mere signature" is not enough to prove voluntariness
and understanding. "To assume that, notwithstanding strong evidence to the contrary,
a signature implies understanding is to allow a rule of contract law to play too salient
a part in the administration of a remedial civil rights statute." 538 F.2d at 1098). But
see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007
(6th Cir. 1975) ("Gardner-Denver did not hold that a grievant may accept an award
of an arbitrator and settle with his employer, and thereafter sue his employer for
additional benefits." However, neither settlement nor acceptance of an arbitration
award precludes an EEOC enforcement suit. 525 F.2d at 1010). See generally Guerra
v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974) (Arbitration has no res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent court suit. Id. at 657 n.44).
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note 21, nor have bothered to dispel the prophecies of doom for
arbitration." In Gardner-Denver, the Court sought to preserve
judicial finality in Title VII decisions while reaffirming its faith
in arbitration. Thus the Court emphasized that arbitration
"remains a relatively inexpensive and expeditious means for
resolving a wide range of disputes, including claims of discrimi-
natory employment practices."7
2. Southbridge Plastics
In a recent decision, Southbridge Plastics Division, W.R.
Grace & Company v. Local 759 Int'l Union of United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers,77 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals ordered arbitration of grievances which it knew
would bring Title VII into issue. The employer and the EEOC
executed a conciliation agreement calling for sex quotas in de-
termining layoffs. These quotas flatly "contradicted the stan-
dard seniority provision in the collective bargaining agreement
that layoffs would be determined by an employee's seniority,
not his or her sex.
'78
The employer sought a declaratory judgment in federal
district court that the EEOC conciliation agreement su-
perceded the seniority provision. The union couinterclaimed for
arbitration of all grievances arising from the £,nployer's breach
of the seniority provision in following the EEOC conciliation
agreement. The district court upheld the conciliation agree-
ment as "necessary to cure the effects of past hiring discrimina-
tion by the Company and to effectuate the goals of Title VII
" 179
The Fifth Circuit reversed 0 and granted the union's coun-
terclaim. That court based its decision upon the recent Su-
preme Court opinion in United States v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters,8 which held that "bona fide" seniority sys-
tems "negotiated and maintained without a discriminatory
11 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974).
8Id. at 55 (emphasis added).




" 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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purpose" were legal under Title VII,sz even if they perpetrated
"the effects of an employer's pre-act or post-act discrimination
. . ." The Fifth Circuit found no discriminatory purpose in
the seniority provision and, following the Teamsters opinion,
ordered "arbitration of all grievances arising out of the Com-
pany's breach, through its employment of the conciliation
agreement, of the seniority provisions contained in the agree-
ment." 4 Under such an order, the arbitrator will invariably be
faced with Title VII questions.
B. Practical Illustrations of Arbitral Considerations of Title
VII Policies
A detailed examination of several situations in which arbi-
trators considered the policy behind Title VII reveals the com-
plex questions inherent in Title VII implementation. By focus-
ing on the dilemma of arbitrators in specific settings, the diffi-
culty of separating the contract from the law and the policy
become apparent.
1. Married Stewardess Cases
One area in which arbitrators have considered the policy
of Title VII involved the "no-marriage rules" for stewardesses.
In Southern Airways, Inc.,"5 two stewardesses were discharged
because each had married. Under the collective bargaining
agreement, the only reason the discharge could have been sus-
tained was for "just cause." Thus, the validity of the discharge
hinged on whether marriage constituted a "just cause."
The married stewardesses prohibition had been incorpo-
rated into the collective bargaining agreement under the stipu-
lation that its validity would be determined in arbitration. At
11 Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) provides: "Notwithstanding
any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system . .. ."
11 565 F.2d at 916 (citation omitted). See also Hollander & Co., 64 LAB. ARB. REP.
816 (1975) ("Neither Title VII nor approved affirmative action programs necessarily
invalidate seniority systems." Id. at 820).
565 F.2d at 917.
47 LAB. ARB. RE. 1135 (1966).
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arbitration, the company urged that since the parties had au-
thority to agree upon the ban the inquiry of the arbitration
board was limited to strict contract interpretation, "and not
whether [the ban] should be illegal because of social policy or
modern trends of thought."8 The company's chief argument
was that the ban was reasonable, and constituted a bona fide
occupational qualification under Title VII. 7
In support of its argument, the company introduced volu-
minous expert testimony on the rationale for the marriage ban.
The initial barrage consisted of an attempt to prove that mar-
riage was incompatible with the job, by attempting to show
that the life of a stewardess was less regular than that of other
jobs normally held by "girls.""8 Soon, however, pregnancy
emerged as the company's real reason for desiring the restric-
tion.
The company introduced testimony of a doctor who cited
statistics to substantiate his theory that pregnancy almost in-
variably followed marriage within a short time. 9 The company
urged that marriage (i.e., pregnancy) was the cause of a pleth-
ora of ills that could befall stewardesses, including miscarriage,
anemia, impaired "ability of the red blood corpuscles or hemo-
globin to carry oxygen to the tissues," "toxemia," "infection,"
hypertension, "a greater tendency to accident proneness be-
cause of the change in body carriage accompanied with carry-
ing a fetus" and excessive urination due to increased bladder
pressure. To add insult to injury, it was also argued that mar-
ried stewardesses would undermine the company's advertising
program which revolved around "the image of stewardesses as
'young, attractive, and unencumbered.'-"1
91 Id. at 1136.
A bona fide occupational qualification is an exception to Title VII. Section
703(e) of the Act provides that "it shall not be an unlawful employment practice" to
discriminate on account of "religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasona-
bly necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise .... "
This exception is expressly limited to religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)-2(e) (1970).
I 47 LAB. ARB. REP. at 1137.
99 Id.
0 d.
, Id. at 1138.
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The'Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association re-
sponded that the marriage prohibition was not based upon an
objection to marriage, but upon pregnancy. It refuted the no-
tion that marriage and pregnancy were synonymous, noting
that "[tihere can be married stewardesses who are not preg-
nant and pregnant stewardesses who are not married. 92 The
Association's presentation decimated the company's argument
that married stewardesses could not perform their job as well
as single stewardesses.
Arbitrator Saul Wallen agreed with the Association. Wal-
len expressly avoided basing his decision upon the law, stating:
The Company's third argument, namely that the rule is
consistent with and not violative of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, is one on which we need not pass. It has not been
deemed in violation of that act [sic] because the Act is rela-
tively new and the subject has not yet been considered by the
administrative agency involved. At this point the question of
the consistency of the rule with the Act is best left to that
agency for determination. Until it acts, the rule carries a
presumption of validity. 3
Wallen then rendered a policy decision. Conceding that mar-
riage bans had been sustained in previous airline arbitrations,
Wallen concluded that such decisions were based solely upon
industry conserit. In the earlier cases, the airlines would point
to each other and insist they could have such a ban because the
others had them, which only exasperated the problem without
confronting the basic issue of discrimination. Wallen broke
with precedent and confronted the issue squarely. He con-
cluded:
When these parties, on signing the current contract (their
first), agreed in effect to submit the question of its reasona-
bleness to a determination by arbitration, they knew or
should have known that the issue would be viewed in its
current context. And in the context of today's attitudes to-
ward the question in the airlines industry, we are unable to




"Id. at 1141 (emphasis added).
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The sharpest criticism was aimed at the company's adver-
tising campaign. By trying to project an image of comely,
young, single stewardesses, the company argued that it was
trying to sell "atmosphere. '9 5 Wallen rejected the fallacy be-
hind the assumption that marriage somehow detracted from a
woman's beauty or charm. Even if airlines were in the business
of selling such "atmosphere," that was, Wallen opined, still no
justification for firing married stewardesses. Wallen noted that
the image which the company was attempting to project ac-
tually was a "composite." Simply because some stewardesses
were married would not detract from their overall single
image."
A few arbitrators joined Wallen in striking down no-
marriage rules,97 but many refused to do so." It was, however,
Wallen's view which eventually prevailed. His opinion was vin-
dicated by the courts in Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc.,99
which held that airline marriage prohibitions were illegally dis-
criminatory when applied only to women.'01
Ironically, successes like Wallen's raise two criticisms to
policy considerations in Title VII arbitrations. First, it is too
simplistic just to consider such successes as examples that ar-
11 Id. at 1140.
I !d.
" See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 48 LAB. ARB. REP. 734 (1967); Braniff Airways,
Inc., 48 LAB. ARB. REP. 769 (1965).
11 See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc., 48 LAB. ARB. REP. 727 (1967). ("Whatever
reservations [the arbitration] Board members may have about the wisdom of the no-
marriage policy, it is not the function of the Board members to evaluate the policy on
its merits." Id. at 733).
H9 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
1' Id.; Cf. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (sex not a bona fide occupational qualification for
flight attendant position, therefore, illegal to refuse to hire men for such jobs). But cf.
Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844,
(1977) (Where only women had been hired as stewardesses, a no-marriage rule did not
discriminate on the basis of sex, only marriage. The rule, therefore, was valid under
Title VII.); American Airlines, Inc., 68 LAB. ARm. REP. 527 (1977) (discharge of steward-
ess for corpulence not sex discrimination); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d
1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978) (Maternity leave
policy, as distinguished from marriage prohibition, is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation under section 703e of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). It is consistent
with a common carrier's duty to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of its
passengers. 588 F.2d at 1176 (footnote omitted)).
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bitrators always should consider social policy; for if the courts
decide such cases contrary to the arbitrator, critics would be
quick to seize upon those cases for the proposition that social
policy should not be considered. Second, since policy consider-
ations ultimately are resolvable in court, arbitrators should not
inject their opinions at all. Both of these criticisms are legiti-
mate, but can be satisfactorily answered.
Any case in which an arbitrator's policy considerations are
enforced in court could just as easily be vacated. Arbitrators
are not perfect; but that imperfection is the reason for judicial
review. However, simply because perfection is unattainable, a
blanket prohibition against policy considerations is not war-
ranted. Toward the goal of promoting expeditious and econom-
ical resolutions of labor grievances, arbitrators should not be
expected to shut their eyes to policy, since employment dis-
crimination grievances involve considerations beyond the
printed labor agreement. By submitting such grievances to ar-
bitration, the parties invariably invoke policy considerations.
Since Title VII grievances transcend the agreement, it is ridicu-
lous to take such grievances to arbitration and then demand
that the arbitrator constrain his or her deliberations to the
agreement.
Title VII is the epitome of overlapping legal, policy and
contract considerations. Because of the complexities of these
considerations, arbitration can provide, at minimum, an outlet
for airing disputes. In many cases a satisfactory settlement
results, while in other cases the parties will abide by the arbi-
trator's decision. In probably the least number of cases an em-
ployee who loses in arbitration will file suit in federal court.
Even then, under footnote 21 of Gardner-Denver, the court
may look to the arbitration decision. Finally, arbitration can
provide an early means of weeding out frivolous or vexatious
claims.
2. Maternity Benefits Cases
Another context in which arbitrators have faced Title VII
questions involves maternity restrictions, minus the marriage
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disguise. In Middletown Board of Education, 10, a teacher's con-
tract provided that "[t]eachers . . .may become eligible for
a maternity leave subject to the following conditions. ... 01
The condition in issue provided that "[tleachers shall be re-
quired to vacate their positions at the end of the fifth month
of pregnancy." ' 3
M, a non-tenured teacher, became pregnant but refused to
vacate her position, citing the permissive "may" in the mater-
nity leave provision. The school board cited the mandatory
"shall" in the fifth month condition and demanded that M
leave school at the end of her fifth month of pregnancy. 4 M's
union argued that the permissive language gave M a choice of
whether to take maternity leave, and if she chose to do so only
then must she leave at the end of the fifth month.15 The school
board contended that M had no choice. If so interpreted, the
union argued, the fifth month condition should be void under
a nondiscrimination clause and the following conflict with laws
provision: "Nothing in this Agreement shall in any way limit
or contrvene [sic] the authority of any Municipal, State or
Federal board, commission, agency, or other governmental
body or authority." 10
Applying policy considerations, arbitrator John Hogan
held the fifth month condition void under both the nondiscri-
mination and the conflict with laws clauses. Hogan stated:
The decision turns on whether or not the five-month rule
... constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex. If it does,
then it contravenes Public Policy as defined by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. The Clause would also limit or contra-
vene a "Federal Board, Commission or agency, or other gov-
ernmental body or authority". . . that sought to apply Title
VII. So that if it be found that [the fifth month condition]
constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex, the clause con-
flicts with [the conflict with laws provision] and is void as
contravening public policy.'
101 56 LAB. ARm. REP. 830 (1971).
,,2 Id. (emphasis supplied).




,07 Id.; cf. Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D.
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Likewise, in Kaiser-Permanente Medical Care Program, 13
arbitrator Daniel Dykstra accepted the "principle" that arbi-
trators should respect the collective bargaining agreement and
refrain from venturing on "frolics of their own;" nevertheless,
this "principle" did not require that contract provisions be
"interpreted in a vacuum."'0 9 Dykstra applied this reasoning as
a prelude to striking down a company practice of granting sick
leave without pay for pregnancy-related disabilities. Dykstra
evaluated the practice in light of modern public thought; and
while he did not feel bound by either state or federal law, he
did consider the law as "part and parcel of the contemporary
scene,"110 which buttressed arguments against the practice.
Under Dykstra's analysis, sick leave and nondiscrimi-
nation provisions were much less susceptible to precise inter-
pretation than traditional terms of collective bargaining. More
traditional labor issues, such as wages and hours, already have
a developed body of precedent behind them, while modern sick
leave and nondiscrimination clauses "admittedly are not given
to precise interpretation and. . . are in the process of evolve-
ment in Courts and administrative agencies."'' Due to the flux
in social and legal thought, more flexibility was required in
interpreting such provisions.
Arbitrators Hogan in Middletown Board of Education and
Dykstra in Kaiser-Permanente distinguished between policy
and law. Admittedly, such a distinction is difficult since law
evolves from policy. There are, however, interstices of the law
which may properly be classified as policies. Because these
areas do not fall squarely within the law, but just outside its
Te'x. 1971) (rule requiring women to leave their jobs no more than 2 months prior to
giving birth is "a condition attendant to. . .sex," id. at 329, precisely "condemned"
by EEOC guidelines), rev'd on othergrounds, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1107 (1973), reh. denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). The Fifth Circuit reversed on
the basis that the Texas Employment Commission, a state agency, was not an em-
ployer under Title VII, and that the mandatory leave rule was reasonable and ration-
ally related to a permissible state purpose under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In 1972, however, Congress amended Title VII to include
states and their political subdivisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970); see City of Los
Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, (1978).
,o 64 LAB. Ain. REP. 245 (1975).
' Id. at 247.




parameters, they possess legal characteristics. Pregnancy is an
example.
Prior to October 31, 1978, under Title VII, discrimination
against pregnant women was not considered sex-based, but
instead was based upon a physical condition attendant to
sex.112 Although only women can become pregnant, the Su-
preme Court has ruled that pregnancy discrimination was not
sex discrimination. In Geduldig v. Aiello,"3 the Court upheld
a pregnancy exclusion under a State of California disability
insurance program. Since a state regulation was being at-
tacked, the test for validity was not Title VII, but the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court found the exclusion nondiscriminatory, reason-
ing that the "program does not exclude anyone from benefit
eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabili-
ties." ' Two years after Geduldig, the Court applied the same
reasoning to a private disability insurance program in General
Electric Company v. Gilbert.15 This time, Title VII was di-
rectly in issue, and the Court analogized the foregoing equal
protection "concepts of discrimination" to Title VII. Discrimi-
nation based on pregnancy, the Court held, was not an illegal,
"gender-based discrimination."
"I2 Under Act of October 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1976)), the terms in Title VII "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" were
amended to include pregnancy and its related medical conditions.
113 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
"I Id. at 496 n.20 (citations omitted).
5, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
,,' Id. at 135. But see City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978) (State pension plan requirement that women contribute more
money than men discriminated on the basis of sex. This requirement was distinguisha-
ble from that in General Electric Company, which "discriminated on the basis of a
special physical disability." Id. at 715). See generally Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (A woman employee's job with the Environmental Protection Agency
was dissolved after she repulsed her male supervisor's sexual advances. The EPA
argued that the action was not based upon the employee's sex, but upon her refusal to
provide sexual favors. The court responded that the employee would not have been
approached by her superior but for her sex. Therefore, there was a sex discrimination
in this case. The court distinguished this situation from one where a bisexual supervi-
sor might approach a subordinate, since "the insistence upon sexual favors would not
constitute gender discrimination because it would apply to male and female employees
alike." Id. at 990 n.55).
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Prior to October 31, 1978, pregnancy was an interstice
(policy) within Title VII. When arbitrators involve themselves
in this area, they reason from policy as distinguished from law.
Other interstices exist."7 Some are fairly esoteric; and the more
esoteric they are, the more apparent are the policy considera-
tions, as distinguished from legal considerations.
3. Locker Room Restrictions
An amusing example of another interstice is FMC Corp., "
8
where arbitrator Joseph Shister was confronted with an unu-
sual sex discrimination claim. Three women were hired as
plant janitors. Their duties included cleaning two men's locker
rooms, but due to the enormity and twenty-four hour use of the
locker rooms, it was virtually impossible for the female janitors
to clean them without seeing unclad male workers."'
Because this situation was objectionable, the employer
reassigned the duties between male and female janitors so as
to exclude the women from the men's locker rooms. The female
janitors lost valuable overtime which was accumulated by
cleaning the men's locker rooms. The women filed a sex dis-
crimination grievance, and the male janitors whose duties had
been reassigned grieved of reverse discrimination against the
employer.120
The union and the employer tried every conceivable way
"I See, e.g., Uddo v. Taormina, 45 LAB. Ann. REP. 72 (1965). In Uddo, the legal
interstice that the "American government has not yet enacted penalties for the failure
. . . to vote," id. at 74, was the fulcrum of that decision. In accordance with a collective
bargaining agreement, the employer had agreed to close his plant one hour early to
allow his employees to vote. However, he offered to pay only those employees who
signed a statement that they actually had voted, which resulted in a loss of pay for
those who did not, or could not, vote. This action precipitated a grievance, which went
to arbitration. Id. Since there was no law on the subject, the social policy made the
difference. The arbitrator noted:
American government has not yet exacted penalties for the failure of a citi-
zen to vote. Clearly, therefore, it is against public policy to allow a private
employer to do so. The same holds true where the effects of a system unilater-
ally imposed by the employer in meeting the problems of an election day
clause results in penalizing the non-voter.
Id.
1,8 70 LAB. ARt. REP. 110 (1978).




to negotiate a settlement which would have equalized the du-
ties between the male and female janitors, but their efforts
failed. The union finally took the matter to arbitration. The
employer argued that the discrimination against the females
"was based on sound and reasonable considerations, consistent
with public policy, and therefore not contractually or legally
violative."'
The labor agreement contained a nondiscrimination provi-
sion. Sex was included in that provision "because both parties
agreed that the clause was required by public policy-the Fed-
eral Civil Rights Act of 1964 . ... "2 With this stipulation in
mind, arbitrator Shister framed the issue as whether the em-
ployer's exclusion of the female janitors from the male locker
rooms violated public policy.1" He held that it did not.
The opinion contained no discussion as to the nature of the
policy, but merely implied its existence. Offhand, this implica-
tion appears unsatisfactory. At least a terse explanation of why
society dictates nonexposure of unclad members of the opposite
sex should have seemed helpful, but Shister tendered none. In
fairness to Shister, however, there was no conflict over the
policy. "[T]he Union itself admitted that the exposure of
nude males to females would generate complaints by the male
employees.""12 With the issue thus stipulated, there was no
advantage in Shister generating more adversity by raising a
major policy discussion. But more fundamentally, the policy
was fairly implicit'2s and there was no need to discuss it. FMC
Corp. turned upon a legal interstice, implicitly understood, and
is therefore a classic example of a social policy arbitration.
The lesson from these legal interstices is that arbitrators




'2 Id. Shister did obliquely refer to sex as a bona fide occupational qualification,
but declined to explain why. He presumably took the reason for granted. Cf. Ludtke
v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (baseball Commissioner's policy of excluding
female reporters from Yankee Stadium locker rooms violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
fourteenth amendment equal protection and due process). In Ludtke, the court re-
jected the defendant's privacy argument, since the undressed players could shield
themselves from the view of female reporters. In FMC Corp., exposure was unavoida-
ble, which precipitated the action.
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may and should consider social policy in Title VII grievances.
The fact that an employment discrimination grievance pro-
ceeds to arbitration invites in the first instance legal considera-
tions. When arbitrators delve into the nature of such com-
plaints and the available remedies, policy considerations then
become critical; the legal interstitial areas lie just beyond the
law, and the law itself is insufficient to address all the underly-
ing issues.
C. Guidelines for Applying Social Policy
As arbitrators consider social policy, the need arises for
some direction in their deliberations. The most prominent
guidelines for the application of such considerations come from
the Supreme Court's footnote 21 in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Company.' Footnote 21 and its accompanying text
suggest that arbitrations may be given weight as evidence in
federal court with the degree of weight dependent upon factors
in the collective bargaining agreement and in the arbitration.
Ultimately, the degree of weight is determined by the trial
court.'27 Although the Court adopted "no standards," it did
suggest that attention might be directed to nondiscrimination
clauses in the collective bargaining agreement, procedural due
process in the arbitration hearing, "adequacy of the record with
respect to the issue of discrimination and the special compe-
tence of particular arbitrators.""' The Court acknowledged
that if an arbitrator "gives full consideration to an employee's
Title VII rights, a court may properly accord [the arbitration]
great weight,""'2 "especially" for questions of fact.'3
Arbitrations like Basic Vegetable Products, Inc.'31 at-
tempted specifically to comply with the Court's guidelines.
Other arbitrators have forged their own standards. In
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,' 32 arbitrator





13, 64 LAB. ARB. REP. 620 (1975). See notes 71-76 supra and accompanying text for
a full discussion of this case.
,"2 64 LAB. ARB. REP. 316 (1974).
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Harry Platt gleaned two conclusions from Gardner-Denver.
First, where a provision in the collective bargaining agreement
conflicts with the federal law, the law "will prevail."' ,, Second,
if arbitrations of Title VII grievances are to be of any "practical
value," they should be heard only by competent arbitrators
"who should give full consideration to Title VII and, by infer-
ence, other relevant Federal statutory and administrative law
"134
Platt was granted wide latitude in deciding four hypotheti-
cal cases submitted in lieu of analogous real life situations
which arose under the employer's affirmative action program.
Neither the union nor the employer contested Platt's authority
or competence to consider the law. Platt commented:
This is as it should be, for there can no longer be any real
question that an arbitrator has both the authority and the
obligation to consider Federal equal employment opportunity
laws in the arbitration of grievances concerning alleged dis-
criminatory employment practices .... This is particularly
true where the collective bargaining agreement contains an
antidiscrimination clause .... "I
A statement of even greater magnitude came from arbitra-
tor Sanford Cohen in Whitfield Tank Lines, Inc., 36 decided in
May 1974, less than three months after Gardner-Denver. An-
swering a claim of racial discrimination, the employer argued
that, in light of Gardner-Denver, Cohen would be wasting his
time by hearing the Title VII grievance. Cohen replied that if
"constitutional history" teaches any lesson at all, Gardner-
Denver will be but the beginning of what promises to be a
protracted development of the question of arbitration and Title
VII.37 "Given the various uncertainties now present," Cohen
rejected the employer's argument.138 "[I]t would appear to be
premature for industrial relations practitioners to simply aban-
'3 Id. at 326.
Il Id.
133 Id.
'' 62 LAB. ARB. REP. 934 (1974).




don the practice of arbitration in the case of disputes involving
questions of discrimination.'
39
D. Review of Title VII Policy Decisions
Policy considerations are difficult to define, especially in
the area of Title VII, where frequently society is found to be
divided. Equal employment opportunity is a principle to which
society is committed, as is manifest by its enactment into law,
but at times it generates great dissension. Reasonable arbitra-
tors can differ in their evaluations of Title VII policy, but the
courts serve as an ultimate check on any erroneous decisions.
An example of a divisive Title VII issue is reverse discrimina-
tion. Examination of an early arbitration of the issue illustrates
the difficult nature of the policy judgments. Hotel Employers
Association'" was decided on November 17, 1966, little more
than a year after the effective date of Title VII.'" The case
arose during the frenzy of civil rights demonstrations in the
1960's. In California, a number of civil rights groups, including
the San Francisco Human Rights Commission, the NAACP
and CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) exerted pressure
upon the Hotel Association to execute a Civil Rights Agree-
ment which essentially provided for the advancement of equal
employment rights for blacks and other minorities. The union
representing certain employees of the Hotel Association chal-
lenged the agreement on the ground that it violated the collec-
tive bargaining agreement by recognizing an organization
which was not the exclusive collective bargaining representa-
tive.1
42
The union took its complaint to arbitration and the arbi-
tration panel held the Civil Rights Agreement void. The union
argued that the agreement conflicted with and purported to
"supercede" the collective bargaining contract. 143 More signifi-
cant, the agreement was deemed "unlawful and contrary to
public policy" because it created a "discrimination in favor of
is' Id.
" 47 LAB. ARB. RP. 873 (1966).
"' Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965.




one group of employees" against another. '44
The arbitration panel based its decision upon social policy
under Title VII. Although the statute was designed to protect
minority rights, the panel felt the policy protected all groups.
"Preference" for any group at the expense of another was
deemed "unlawful." '45 The panel noted:
Discrimination against any individual in hiring or discharg-
ing or with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin is unlawful under Fed-
eral law [citing Title VII] and is an unlawful employment
practice under California Law . . . . The 1966 civil rights
agreement is against public policy of the United States and
State of California.'"
The flux of social policy, as demonstrated by recent reverse
discrimination cases,147 is the reason for judicial review of Title
VII policy considerations by arbitrators. Arbitrators are not
accountable to the public. When they consider social policy,
however, they do construct a body of what becomes, in effect,
public law.
Arbitrations generally are nonreviewable on their merits.'48
Merits consist of fact findings and contract interpretations.
Concerning merits, policy considerations fall into three catego-
ries. First is industrial policy, which is gleaned from the labor
agreement and industrial practice. "Just cause" is the most
prevalent example, since a fully developed body of industrial
policy revolves around this single concept. Second is public
'"Id.
" Id. at 886.
"' Id. at 886-87 (citations omitted). While it is true that Title VII protects not only
minority, but also majority rights, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976), it is not always true that preference for one group over another is
illegal, especially under the remedial provisions of Title VII, such as § 706(g) (court
may order "affirmative action . . . or any other equitable relief" when it finds an
employer which has engaged in "unlawful employment practices") 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1970). See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979), but
cf. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, (1978) (quota system
for admission to university medical school illegal under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
£4, See note 70 supra for citation of these cases.
,48 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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law, which is derived from statutes, judicial opinions and ad-
ministrative rulings. Title VII and its interpretations provide
an example. Third is social policy, which emanates from the
public law. Examples of this category are the legal interstices
discussed earlier.
149
Of these three categories, only industrial policy comprises
non-judicially reviewable merits. As the law of the shop, in-
dustrial policy is strictly the arbitrator's domain. The other two
categories, public law and social policy, extend beyond the law
of the shop into the public domain. Therefore, it violates no
legal or contractual principle to permit judicial review of legal
and policy considerations of arbitrators. Nothing novel is in-
volved. When a court is asked to review a Title VII arbitration,
it may, under the Gardner-Denver guidelines, accord the arbi-
tration whatever deference it chooses. It may apply the sub-
stantial evidence rule or grant a trial de novo. Both procedures
already are utilized.
In Kornbluh v. Stearns and Foster Company,150 John
Kornbluh was fired for falsifying his employment application.
Kornbluh raised a Title VII complaint which went to arbitra-
tion. The record reflected that Kornbluh was represented fairly
by the union at the arbitration and that the arbitration was
procedurally fair. The arbitrator decided all the issues, includ-
ing the Title VII grievance, against Kornbluh.5 '
Kornbluh brought a Title VII action in federal court. Rely-
ing upon footnote 21, the employer moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that all material facts had been fully aired
and resolved at arbitration." 2 The company unsuccessfully
argued that the court should defer to the arbitral decision. The
court acknowledged that thd arbitration had complied with
footnote 21 in all respects, except one. The procedure was fair,
the arbitrator was competent, the record was complete and all
the issues were considered. However, one element was absent:
the collective bargaining agreement contained no nondiscrimi-
,HI See notes 112-18 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of legal inters-
tices.
, 73 F.R.D. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
,5' Id. at 311.
252 Id. at 312.
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nation provision. Even if such a provision had existed, the
court still was "not satisfied that [footnote 21 meant] or
dictate[d] that an arbitration award made under the factor
satisfying circumstances would [have been] of sufficient
'weight' on which to base a summary judgment.' 5 3
Nevertheless, lack of a nondiscrimination clause in the
labor contract appears to have been harmless error. If, as the
court found, the Title VII issues had been fully raised and
decided at arbitration, the employer waived its argument that
Kornbluh had no Title VII rights under the agreement. Neither
party to the suit had relied on the lack of a nondiscrimination
provision.
The court, however, was not satisfied that the arbitration
was reliable enough upon which to base a summary judgment.
Summary judgment is harsh, sustainable only upon proof
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."' 4 Therefore, it is understandable that a federal court
would be reticent to grant summary judgment upon facts es-
tablished outside of court. It would have been interesting if,
instead of moving for summary judgment, Steams and Foster
had moved that the arbitration be granted as evidence at trial.
This approach was taken in Dripps v. United Parcel
Service. 15 In Dripps, the plaintiff, a welder, challenged as male
sex discrimination a job-related rule against growing a beard.
The employer cited safety and personal appearance as justifi-
cations for the rule. The court held that the rule was a "bona
fide occupational qualification based on reasonable concern for
safety."'55 Citing Gardner-Denver Company,"' the Court ac-
corded "great weight" to an arbitrator's like ruling. Similarly,
in Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hospital,"' the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, also citing Gardner-Denver, refused to over-
turn a district court's use of an earlier arbitration decision."'
153 Id.
I FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
1" 381 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Pa. 1974), affd mem., 515 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1975).
In 381 F. Supp. at 421.
'M Id. at 422.
'' 563 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1977).
'"' Id. at 330.
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These cases illustrate that a court may give the arbitrator's
determination "great weight" or it may choose to evaluate the
issues differently. Whichever result obtains, judges of equal
employment opportunity cases, be they courts or arbitrators,
must constantly be conscious of the policy surrounding the law.
CONCLUSION
Three conclusions emerge from the controversy of Title VII
policy considerations by arbitrators. First, social policy consid-
erations in Title VII arbitrations remain active, but the courts
have pulled in the reins. Since arbitrators are not accountable
to the public, some guidelines are necessary to assist them
when they tread from their familiar terrain into the public
domain.
Second, it is permissible for arbitrators to enter the public
domain when they hear Title VII grievances. This conclusion
certainly is true when the collective bargaining agreement pro-
vides a framework of contractual rights co-extensive with Title
VII, or in cases like Kornbluh v. Stearns and Foster
Company,16 where, although there is no nondiscrimination
clause, the employer waives this defect. The concept is concur-
rent or overlapping jurisdiction, as distinguished from exclu-
sive jurisdiction in the federal courts. Finally, and most impor-
tant, is the nature of Title VII and how it espouses the single
social policy of equal employment opportunity. The law itself
is not overly complicated, but implementation is complex. The
present difficulties with implementing the law arise not from
the language of the statute, but from the values beneath it.
Title VII considerations cannot be mechanistically or even logi-
cally applied. All Title VII decisions, judicial and arbitral, ulti-
mately revolve around value judgments, and these judgments
invariably reflect the values of the judge or arbitrator making
the decision. Like judges, arbitrators owe society a duty to
consider policy from society's viewpoint, rather than only from
their own.
Arbitrators are not public tribunals, nor are they intended
'- 73 F.R.D. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1976). See notes 151-55 and accompanying text supra
for a discussion of Kornbluh.
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to be. Therefore, courts should reserve the right to review social
policy considerations in Title VII arbitrations. If arbitrators are
to consider social policy, it is incumbent upon the courts to
review those considerations.'' Nevertheless, arbitration should
retain its role as an expeditious and economical method of
resolving labor disputes. It cannot be used as a panacea for all
such disputes, but it can produce the very desirable result of
fairly and rapidly resolving many problems. This manner of
resolution is particularly crucial in light of the high incidence
of Title VII grievances today. Courts could not possibly hear all
Title VII complaints, the parties could not possibly afford the
expense and industry could not bear such a substantial adverse
impact. Therefore, labor and management should be free to use
their ingenuity in granting arbitrators latitude in putting Title
VII grievances to rest. After all, subject only to the "constraints
of statute and public policy," the combinations of what arbi-
trators may consider is "virtually unlimited."'
' 2
The Supreme Court recently intimated that courts should
refrain from interceding in business affairs. "Courts are gener-
ally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they
should not attempt it.' '51 3 This area is where arbitration fills the
gap in policing "industrial self-government."' 64 So long as arbi-
tration awards draw their "essence from the agreement" and
do not "manifest an infidelity" to the agreement, courts should
respect those awards. 5
The purpose of the guidelines for arbitrators considering
social policy in Title VII grievances is to insure fairness at all
"I Metal Products Workers, Local 1645 v. Torrington Co., 358 F.2d 103, 106 (2d
Cir. 1966); Local 453, Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Otis
Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
M Walter A. Stanley & Son, Inc. v. Trustees of Hackley School, 366 N.E.2d 1339,
1340-41 (N.Y. 1977) (per curiam).
HI Furco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
164 Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corp., 399 F. Supp. 1184, 1188 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
113 San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Tribune Publishing Co., 407 F.2d
1327 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960)); cf. Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.
1969) (An arbitration award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment if the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement
...." Id. at 1128).
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stages of the arbitral process. Toward that end, there is no
fault. But the guidelines do not, and should not, foreclose arbi-
trators from considering social policy. Only then can arbitra-
tion fulfill its role in promoting industrial peace under the pol-
icy of equal employment opportunity.
